Functional Finance and Intergenerational Distribution In a Keynesian OLG model by Skott, Peter & Ryoo, Soon
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2015
Functional Finance and Intergenerational
Distribution In a Keynesian OLG model
Peter Skott
University of Massachusetts - Amherst, pskott@econs.umass.edu
Soon Ryoo
Adelphi University, sryoo@adelphi.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Skott, Peter and Ryoo, Soon, "Functional Finance and Intergenerational Distribution In a Keynesian OLG model" (2015). Economics
Department Working Paper Series. 184.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/184
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
Functional finance and 
intergenerational distribution in a 
Keynesian OLG model 
 
by 
 
Skott, Peter 
Ryoo, Soon 
 
 
Working Paper 2015-13 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Functional finance and intergenerational distribution in a 
Keynesian OLG model1 
Peter Skott2  and Soon Ryoo3 
 
 
 
 This paper examines the role of fiscal policy in the long run. We show that (i) dynamic 
inefficiency in a standard OLG model generates aggregate demand problems in a Keynesian setting, (ii) 
fiscal policy can be used to achieve full-employment growth, (iii) the required debt ratio is inversely 
related to both the growth rate and government consumption, and (iv) a simple and distributionally neutral 
tax scheme can maintain full employment in the face of variations in ‘household confidence’. 
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1  Introduction 
 A standard OLG framework has important weaknesses from a Keynesian perspective. It 
assumes that desired household saving at full employment is automatically turned into investment; there 
are no aggregate demand problems. This paper presents an OLG model that includes Keynesian concerns. 
Households save but investment decisions are made by firms.  
It is well known that neoclassical OLG models can produce dynamic inefficiency and that, if this 
happens, fiscal policy and public debt can be Pareto improving (Diamond 1965). This outcome -- 
dynamic inefficiency -- is sometimes dismissed as empirically irrelevant (Abel et al. 1989). The standard 
argument for irrelevance, however, does not apply under imperfect competition (Skott and Ryoo 2014), 
and what appears as a problem of dynamic inefficiency in a neoclassical version of the model turns into a 
problem of aggregate demand and unemployment in a Keynesian setting. 
The existence of a link from dynamic inefficiency to aggregate demand clearly does not exclude 
other sources of aggregate demand problems. Indeed, an OLG setting with an implied period length that 
greatly exceeds a normal business cycle cannot be used to analyze the short-run problems that dominate 
macroeconomic policy. Why then analyze a stylized OLG model? Our motivation is two-fold. 
Intergenerational fairness – the distribution of income across generations – has figured strongly in debates 
on public debt; arguably, an OLG framework can be useful for the analysis of these issues. The obsession 
with public debt and the alleged long-run dangers of high levels of debt, second, is surprising: dominant 
macroeconomic models satisfy ‘Ricardian equivalence’ and imply that public debt becomes largely 
irrelevant. This irrelevance of debt in benchmark theoretical models may explain the prominence in the 
debate of purely empirical studies.1 Our analysis contributes a theoretical perspective on this (and other) 
                                                      
1 Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) suggestion that debt-income levels above 90 percent tend to be associated with 
lower rates of economic growth has been discredited (Herndon et al. 2014), and the broader Reinhart and Rogoff 
analysis has been challenged by other studies (e.g. Irons and Bivens (2010), Dube (2013), Basu (2013)). But the 
challenge has been largely empirical. 
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policy issues, incl. ‘secular stagnation’. We deliberately choose a setting in which public debt matters, 
and the focus on long-run issues, rather than short-run business cycles, implies that some of the obvious 
drawbacks of the OLG model become less important. 
Adopting a ‘functional finance’ approach, we assume that monetary policy determines the rate of 
interest and the choice of technique, leaving fiscal policy to ensure a trajectory of aggregate demand that 
is consistent with full employment. Our steady growth analysis shows a long-run relationship between the 
required debt ratio and the rate of growth, but the causal link unambiguously runs from growth to debt: a 
low growth rate generates a high steady-growth ratio of debt to income. The required debt, moreover, is 
inversely related to government consumption. Similar results have been found in other Keynesian models 
(e.g. Schlicht 2006, Ryoo and Skott 2013). Obtaining the results using a widely accepted OLG structure 
strengthens the argument. 
Extending the analysis beyond steady growth, we examine the implications of shifts in 
‘household confidence’ that lead to fluctuations in saving rates. A simple and distributionally neutral tax 
scheme can maintain full employment in the face of shifts in confidence that would otherwise lead to 
problems of aggregate demand and secular stagnation. Moreover, in the special case where households 
correctly anticipate future taxes, no variations in taxes will be needed: the tax policy effectively functions 
as an insurance scheme. Concerns over the sustainability of the public debt trajectory, finally, find no 
support. A fiscal policy based on functional finance may in some cases lead to high levels of public debt. 
But no scenarios become explosive or otherwise unsustainable in this OLG setting. 
The Keynesian literature on functional finance has a long history, going back to Lerner (1943).2 
We know of no other Keynesian studies, however, that use a formal OLG structure to examine the 
long-run implications of functional finance. 3  OLG models have been used to analyze dynamic 
                                                      
2 Pedersen (1937) articulated a similar principle of functional finance (Olesen (2001)). Recent contributions include 
Schlicht (2006), Godley and Lavoie (2007), Arestis and Sawyer (2010), Kregel (2010), Ryoo and Skott (2013), 
Skott (2015). 
3  Skott and Ryoo’s (2014) analysis of fiscal policy in an OLG model with imperfect competition includes no 
Keynesian elements and the focus is on steady states; there are no fluctuations in ‘confidence’, and the paper does 
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inefficiency and public debt dynamics but not from the perspective of functional finance. Chalk (2000), 
for instance, assumes a constant primary deficit per worker. He finds that even if the economy is 
dynamically inefficient when public debt is zero, a constant primary deficit may be unsustainable; 
moreover, in those cases where a primary deficit is sustainable, convergence is to a steady growth path 
that is dynamically inefficient. These results invite several questions. Why would a government want to 
pursue policies of this kind? Why focus on trajectories that keep a constant primary deficit? Economic 
analysis of monetary policy typically looks for ‘optimal’ policies (or policy rules), given some welfare 
function and a model of how the economy operates. Our functional finance approach introduces elements 
that are usually absent in the analysis of monetary policy, but the search for appropriate policies is in a 
similar spirit. 
Section 2 analyzes the choice of technique. Section 3 completes the Keynesian OLG model by 
introducing household behavior and firms’ investment decisions. We add taxation and public debt and 
derive the full-employment requirements for fiscal policy in section 4. Fluctuations in ‘confidence’ and 
their implications for fiscal policy are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 relates the analysis to recent policy 
debates. Section 7 presents a few concluding remarks. 
 
2  Functional finance and the choice of technique 
Keynesian growth models typically assume a Leontief (fixed-coefficients) production function. 
This seemingly restrictive specification can be justified in a number of ways. The capital controversy 
criticized the use of a smooth aggregate production function from a theoretical perspective, and the degree 
and relevance of substitutability can also be questioned empirically. In this paper, however, we take a 
different approach: a Leontief specification can be justified along lines that are consistent with Lerner’s 
analysis of functional finance.  
Monetary policy, Lerner argued, should be used to set interest rates at levels that induce an 
                                                                                                                                                                              
not address questions of intergenerational fairness. 
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optimal amount of investment or, equivalently, an optimal share of investment in output (assuming that 
fiscal policy keeps output at full employment). An optimal share of investment in output translates into an 
optimal capital-output ratio in the long run, that is, an optimal choice of technique. Intuitively, our 
Keynesian OLG model differs from standard neoclassical versions by separating investment and saving 
decisions. Firms make employment and investment decisions based on factor prices and demand 
conditions, and factor prices do not automatically adjust to ensure full employment at all times. Instead 
the interest rate (the cost of finance) is set so as to make firms choose the capital intensity that is deemed 
socially optimal. The fixed coefficients of the Leontief production function can be seen as the outcome of 
this profit maximizing choice of technique, given a policy-determined interest rate. 
Following Skott (1989, chapter 5), firms may be able to choose from a range of blueprints when 
they make an investment decision. But ex post – once an investment has been made in particular plant and 
machinery – the substitutability between ‘capital’ and ‘labor’ is limited. Assume, for simplicity, that the 
ex ante production function is Cobb-Douglas, 
௧ܻ ൌ ܭ௧ఈ ௧ܰଵି஑,				0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1                            (1) 
where ௧ܻ, ܭ௧ and ௧ܰ are the amount of output, capital and employment, respectively. Let ௧ܹ and ௧ܲ 
be the money wage rate and the price of capital goods, and let ݅ and ߜ denote the cost of finance (the 
real rate of interest) and the rate of depreciation. Profit maximizing firms will minimize cost: 
 ݉݅݊௅೟,௄೟								 ௧ܹ ௧ܰ൅ሺ݅ ൅ δሻ ௧ܲܭ௧                              (2) 
 s. t.					ሺݑ∗ܭ௧ሻ஑ ௧ܰଵିఈ ൌ ௧ܻ 
Firms may want to maintain a certain amount of excess capacity on average; the reason for this include 
lumpiness in investment (a minimum scale of investment), short run volatility of demand at the firm level, 
and entry deterrence. Thus, the constraint in the minimization problem allows for the desired utilization 
rate of capital (ݑ∗) to be less than one. The first order conditions imply that  
௒೟
ே೟ ൌ λ௧ ൌ ቀ
௨∗
௜ାఋ
ఈ
ଵିఈ
ௐ೟
௉೟ ቁ
ఈ			                                       (3) 
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௒೟
௨∗௄೟ ൌ σ௧ ൌ ߣ௧
ିሺଵିఈሻ/ఈ ൌ ቀ ௨∗௜ାఋ
ఈ
ଵିఈ
ௐ೟
௉೟ ቁ
ିሺଵିఈሻ					                          (4) 
The price of capital goods, ௧ܲ, is exogenous to the individual firm (and was treated as such in the 
minimization). In equilibrium, however, this price must be equal to the general price level in a one-good 
model. Assuming profit maximization, the pricing decision is based on marginal cost, and both the 
technical coefficients and the stock of capital are predetermined in the short run. Employment and output 
by contrast are taken to be variable. With excess capital capacity and constant labor productivity, this 
yields a markup on unit labor cost,4  
 ௧ܲ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ሻ ௧ܹ ଵఒ೟ (5) 
where the markup (݉) is determined by the firm’s perceived elasticity of demand, which we take to be 
constant. 
Combining equations (3)-(5)  
ߣ௧ ൌ ߣ ൌ ቂቀ ఈଵିఈቁ ቀ
௨∗
௜ାఋቁ ቀ
ଵ
ଵା௠ቁቃ
ఈ/ሺଵିఈሻ
 (6) 
ߪ௧ ൌ ߪ ൌ ߣିሺଵିఈሻ/ఈ ൌ ቀଵିఈఈ ቁ ቀ
௜ାఋ
௨∗ ቁ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ሻ (7) 
Thus, the choice of technique is fully determined by ݅ , ݑ∗	and ݉. Intuitively, cost minimization 
produces one relation between ߣ௧ and ௧ܹ/ ௧ܲ (for given ݅ሻ; pricing decisions give another relation. In 
equilibrium these two relations – equations (3) and (5) – must be mutually consistent; this consistency 
requirement fixes the real wage and the cost-minimizing input coefficients. In other words, for a given 
interest rate, the cost minimization pins down the coefficients of a Leontief production function:5 
 ܻ ൌ minሼߣܰ, ߪܭሽ (8) 
                                                      
4 The same qualitative outcome of the analysis – the determination of the choice of technique by the interest rate – 
could be derived by assuming a markup on total unit cost. 
5 The argument is quite general and does not depend on the existence of a smooth ex ante production function. For a 
given set of input prices, firms will choose a particular technique, 
                                     ௒ே ൌ ߶ ቀ݅,
ௐ
௉ቁ 
Their pricing decisions, in turn, determines the real wage, 
                                           ௐ௉ ൌ ߰ ቀ
௒
ே , ݅ቁ  
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Using (6) and (7), the real wage and the rate of return on capital are determined by 
 																															ݓ ൌ ௐ௉ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା௠ ߣ ൌ ቂቀ
ఈ
ଵିఈቁ ቀ
௨∗
௜ାఋቁቃ
ఈ/ሺଵିఈሻ ሺ1 ൅ ݉ሻିଵ/ሺଵିఈሻ (9) 
 ܴሺ݅ሻ ൌ ߨݑ∗ߪ െ ߜ ൌ ݉ቀଵିఈఈ ቁ ሺ݅ ൅ ߜሻ െ ߜ (10) 
where ߨ ൌ ݉/ሺ1 ൅ ݉ሻ is the profit share. We assume that ܴሺ݅ሻ ൒ ݅ (or equivalently, ݉ ൒ ߙ/ሺ1 െ ߙሻ). 
The failure of this condition to be met would imply negative net profits (after interest payments) and there 
would be no incentive for firms to invest. 
 
3  OLG models 
3.1  Steady growth 
Following Diamond (1965), all agents live for two periods: they work in the first period and live 
off their savings in the second. The number of workers (ܮ௧) grows at the constant rate ݊ ൒ 0, 
 ܮ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻܮ௧ (11) 
To keep the saving side simple, the utility function for a young agent in period ݐ is taken to be 
logarithmic (or Cobb-Douglas): 
 ܷ ൌ logܿଵ,௧ ൅ ଵଵାఘ ݈݋݃ܿଶ,௧ାଵ (12) 
where ܿଵ,௧ and ܿଶ,௧ାଵ are the levels of consumption per capita when the agent is young and old.6 The 
labor supply is inelastic, and normalizing the supply of an individual worker to one, the budget constraint 
is given by 
 ܿଵ,௧ ൅ ଵଵା௥೟శభ ܿଶ,௧ାଵ ൌ ݓ௧ (13) 
where ݎ௧ାଵ is the rate of return on savings and ݓ௧ is the real wage. 
Utility maximization implies that 
                                                      
6 The more general CIES specification –	ܷ ൌ ௖భ,೟భషഇିଵଵିఏ ൅
ଵ
ଵାఘ
௖మ,೟శభభషഇ ିଵ
ଵିఏ , ߠ ൒ 0 – complicates the analysis and does not 
add much, given the purposes of this paper. 
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 ܿଵ,௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݏሻݓ௧ (14) 
where the young generation’s saving rate ݏ can be written  
 ݏ ൌ ଵଶାఘ (15) 
3.1.1  A non-Keynesian version: dynamic inefficiency 
In non-Keynesian OLG models, saving decisions directly determine investment. Households save 
in the form of fixed capital, and the total saving by the young determines the capital stock in the following 
period  
 ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ܵ௧ ൌ ݏ ௧ܰݓ௧ (16) 
Using (15) and (16), and dividing through by ܭ௧, the growth rate of the capital stock is given by 
 ܭ෡௧ ൌ ௄೟శభ௄೟ െ 1 ൌ ݏሺ1 െ ߨሻ
௒೟
௄೟ െ 1 ൌ
ሺଵିగሻ௨೟ఙ
ଶାఘ െ 1 (17) 
where ݑ௧ ൌ ௧ܻ/ሺߪܭ௧ሻ ൑ 1 is the utilization rate of capital and a hat over a variable is used to denote 
growth rates (ݔො௧ ൌ ሺݔ௧ାଵെݔ௧ሻ/ݔ௧).  
The utilization and accumulation rates are constant in steady growth, full-employment growth 
requires that ܭ෡௧ ൌ ݊, and by assumption the technical coefficient ߪ is given. Thus, if the profit share ߨ 
is determined by the markup, equation (17) determines the steady-growth solution for utilization,	ݑ∗∗.7 
There is an upper bound on utilization, ݑ∗∗ ൑ 1, and full-employment growth becomes impossible if 
there are no solutions satisfying this restriction. The restriction can be written 
 σ ൒ ଵଵିగ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ2 ൅ ߩሻ (18) 
Assuming that (18) is met, adjustments in the utilization rate play the same role as movements 
along the production function in specifications with smooth substitution; the adjustments allow full 
employment growth. But the dynamic inefficiency problem is brought into stark focus by fixed 
coefficients: for utilization rates below one, the marginal product of capital is zero, even though capital 
                                                      
7 With fixed coefficients and a given profit share, the solution is unique, even if ߠ ് 1. Thus, the analysis can be 
extended to cover a general CIES specification of the utility function. Appendix A considers the case with perfect 
competition. When ݑ௧ ൌ ݑ∗∗ ൌ 1, the profit share becomes indeterminate, and adjustments in the profit share can 
allow full employment growth with full utilization; the full utilization solution is unstable, however. 
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gains a positive rate of return. This outcome illustrates a more general point: having profit rates that 
exceed the rate of growth does not imply dynamic efficiency under imperfect competition (Skott and 
Ryoo 2014). 
3.1.2  A Keynesian version: aggregate demand issues 
In a Keynesian economy, firms make the investment and production decisions (and select the 
production technique). Households do not participate directly in these decisions and typically do not own 
the physical capital; households’ ownership of firms takes the form of equity shares. Thus, in place of (16) 
we have 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ∑ܣ௜,௧ାଵ (19) 
where ܣ௜,௧ାଵ represents the agent’s holdings of asset ݅ at the beginning of period ݐ ൅ 1, one of the 
assets being equity.8 
Assume for simplicity that firms finance investment exclusively through corporate bonds and that 
the price of capital goods (= the price of output) is constant. Thus, normalizing the price to one, let 
 ܭ௧ ൌ ܯ௧ (20) 
where ܯ denotes the value of the outstanding corporate bonds. The model now contains two financial 
assets, equity and bonds. It may be reasonable to add another asset, cash. In equilibrium, however, cash 
holdings will be zero if we disregard risk and any need to hold non-interest bearing cash for transactions 
purposes.  
With these assumptions, equation (19) can be written  
 ܵ௧ ൌ ܯ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܸାଵ (21) 
where ௧ܸାଵ is the value of corporate equity. Dividing through by employment ௧ܰାଵ and using (15), we 
now have 
 ݍ௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݏݓ ே೟ே೟శభ (22) 
                                                      
8 We assume complete symmetry among firms. Shares in different firms are perfect substitutes and can be 
aggregated into a single asset, equity. 
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where ݇ ൌ ܭ/ܰ and ݍ is the valuation ratio (Tobin’s q), i.e.,  
 ݍ ൌ ெା௏௄  (23) 
In steady growth ௧ܰ/ ௧ܰାଵ is constant and, using (6)-(7), the steady-growth value of ݇ is given 
by 
 ݇ ൌ ௨∗௄௒
ଵ
௨∗
௒
ே ൌ
஛
ఙ
ଵ
௨∗ (24) 
Thus, ݍ	must be constant in steady growth: 
 ݍ ൌ ݏݓ ଵଵାఏ
ଵ
௞ (25) 
where ߠ is the steady growth rate of ௧ܰ. 
Another steady-growth condition can be derived from households’ portfolio decisions. The 
absence of risk implies that equity and bonds become perfect substitutes and must carry the same rate of 
return. The rate of return is determined by monetary policy: the central bank offers to buy or sell bonds at 
a price that corresponds to its chosen interest rate. The private sector holds no cash when the return on 
bonds is positive, and the equilibrium net position of the central bank therefore will also be zero for any 
positive interest rate.9  
The rate of return on equity adjusts to the interest rate via the valuation of shares.The equality 
between the rate of return on corporate assets and the interest rate i  implies that 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺܯ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܸାଵሻ ൌ ሾ ௧ܻାଵ െ ݓ௧ାଵ ௧ܰାଵ െ ߜܭ௧ାଵሿ ൅ ܯ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܸାଶ௘  (26) 
The term in square brackets represents the sum of dividend and interest payments and ܸ௘ is expected 
equity valuation. Dividing through by ܭ௧ାଵ and using (20) and (23), equation (26) can be written 
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻݍ௧ାଵ ൌ ௧ܻାଵ െ ݓ௧ାଵ ௧ܰାଵ ൅
ሺ1 െ δሻܭ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܸାଶ௘
ܭ௧ାଵ  
ൌ 1 ൅ ܴ ൅ ௧ܸାଶ
௘
ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ 1 ൅ ܴ ൅
ሺܯ௧ାଶ௘ ൅ ௧ܸାଶ௘ ሻ െ ܯ௧ାଶ௘
ܭ௧ାଶ∗
ܭ௧ାଶ௘
ܭ௧ାଵ 
ൌ 1 ൅ ܴ ൅ ሺݍ௧ାଶ௘ െ 1ሻ ௄೟శమ
೐
௄೟శభ (27)                                                       
9 Bank loans and deposits could be used instead of, or in addition to, corporate bonds (Skott 1989).  
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where the return on capital, ܴ ൌ ܴሺ݅ሻ, is given by (10). 
With a constant growth rate and a constant value of ݍ  (cf. equation (25)), it would be 
unreasonable to introduce persistent deviations of actual from expected values. Equation (27) therefore 
reduces to 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻݍ ൌ 1 ൅ ܴሺ݅ሻ ൅ ሺݍ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ (28) 
or 
 ݍ ൌ ோሺ௜ሻିఏ௜ିఏ  (29) 
By assumption ܴሺ݅ሻ ൒ ݅ , and the rate of interest must exceed the growth rate to avoid dynamic 
inefficiency; with this restriction, equation (29) implies ݍ ൒ 1 and ߲ݍ/߲݅ ൏ 0. 
Equations (25) and (29) – together with the constraint ߠ ൏ ݅ – determine a unique steady-growth 
solution for the growth rate ߠ.10 Only by a fluke will this solution be equal to the growth of the labor 
force, n. Formally, a discrepancy between ߠ and n can be avoided by abandoning the requirement that 
ݑ ൌ ݑ∗. The utilization and accumulation rates are constant in steady growth, and full employment 
requires that ܭ෡௧ ൌ ݊. For given values of ߨ, ߪ and n, the condition for full-employment steady growth is 
given by 
ݍሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ൌ ݏሺ1 െ ߨሻ ௒௄ ൌ
ଵ
ଶାఘ ሺ1 െ ߨሻݑߪ   (30) 
where ݍ is given by evaluating (29) at ߠ ൌ ݊. The steady-growth solution for utilization, therefore, 
equals  
 ݑ෤ ൌ ௤ሺଵା௡ሻሺଶାఘሻሺଵିగሻఙ  (31) 
Full-employment steady growth is possible through the adjustment of the utilization rate if the feasibility 
condition, ݑ෤ ൑ 1, is met, i.e.,  
                                                      
10 We have 1 ൅ ߠ ൌ ௦௪௞
௜ିఏ
ோሺ௜ሻିఏ. The left hand side is increasing and the right hand side decreasing in ߠ. 
Existence and uniqueness now follows from the fact that both sides are continuous for ߠ ൑ ݅ and  
 1 ൅ ߠ ൏ ௦௪௞
௜ିఏ
ோሺ௜ሻିఏ	 for ߠ ൌ െ1, 
1 ൅ ߠ ൐ ௦௪௞
௜ିఏ
ோሺ௜ሻିఏ	 for ߠ ൌ ݅. 
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 ߪ ൐ ଵଵିగ ݍሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሺ2 ൅ ߩሻ (32) 
The derivation of ݑ෤  in equation (31) assumes that investment is determined passively by 
household saving and that, as a result, dynamic inefficiency becomes the only downside to high saving. 
The problem of dynamic inefficiency is transformed into one of aggregate demand if the level of 
investment is determined by profit-maximizing firms. The steady-growth requirement ݑ௧ ൌ ݑ∗ can be 
seen as the steady-growth implication of a Harrodian investment function 
 ௗௗ௧ ܭ෡ ൌ ߤሺݑ௧ െ ݑ∗ሻ (33) 
Underlying this stylized description of investment behavior lies a simple claim: profit maximizing firms 
will not maintain a constant rate of accumulation if they have persistent, unwanted excess capacity. Using 
Harrod’s terminology, ܭ෡∗ – the steady growth solution associated with ݑ௧ ൌ ݑ∗ – defines the warranted 
growth rate. A low saving rate implies that the warranted rate is below the natural rate, ܭ෡∗ ൏ ݊ and 
accumulation will be insufficient to keep up with the growth in the labor force. More interesting for 
present purposes is the case of high saving rates and ܭ෡∗ ൐ ݊. In this situation labor constraints imply that 
in the long-run output cannot grow at the warranted rate. Excess capacity must emerge, and the dynamics 
depend on the full specification of investment behavior. The likely result – at least from a Harrodian 
perspective – is downward instability and depression. But whatever the details, if ܭ෡∗ ് ݊, there is no 
steady growth path with full employment and equilibrium in the product market. This general conclusion 
does not depend on our use of a Harrodian specification of investment. The saving side determines the 
solution ݑ෤ : only by chance will this value of the utilization rate be equal to the value determined from the 
investment side.11 
The implausibility of accommodating variations in utilization does not exclude a neoclassical 
route to full-employment growth. The warranted growth rate depends on the interest rate ݅	and capital 
intensity k. Thus, depending on the set of possible techniques, there may be a ‘natural interest rate’ which 
                                                      
11 A simple Kaleckian specification, for instance, assumes that the accumulation rate is positively related to 
utilization, ܫ/ܭ ൌ ݂ሺݑሻ. With this specification, full-employment growth requires ݑ ൌ ݂ିଵሺ݊ ൅ δሻ ⋛ ݑ෤ . 
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induces a choice of technique such that ܭ෡∗ ൌ ݊, thereby equalizing the warranted and natural rates of 
growth. This choice of technique, however, may be dynamically inefficient; the natural interest rate may 
even be negative. In the latter case the economy suffers from a ‘structural liquidity trap’: full-employment 
growth requires a positive inflation rate (Nakatani and Skott 2007, Skott 2001). Whether or not it is 
negative, the natural interest rate will – in general – deviate from the interest rate that is required to induce 
the capital intensity that is deemed socially optimal. A single instrument, the interest rate, cannot 
simultaneously achieve two independent targets. 
These results are closely related to the problems of 'secular stagnation' which have gained recent 
attention (Summers' 2013, 2015). Basically, a failure to reduce the real interest sufficiently leads to 
sustained aggregate demand problems; a successful reduction, on the other hand, may lead to dynamic 
inefficiency. Fiscal policy provides a solution. 
 
4  Public debt 
In standard OLG models, dynamic inefficiency problems can be overcome by introducing a 
public sector and public debt. Analogously, fiscal policy makes it possible to escape aggregate demand 
problems and achieve full-employment growth in our Keynesian OLG model. 
4.1  Adding a public sector 
The government consumes (ܩ௧), levies lumpsum taxes on the young and old generations ( ௧ܶ௒ and 
௧ܶை) and has debt (ܤ௧). With an extra financial asset, young households save in the form of corporate and 
government bonds as well as equity. We assume that these assets are perfect substitutes and have the 
same rate of return, ݎ௧. 
The saving equation (19) now takes the form 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ܯ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܸାଵ ൅ ܤ௧ାଵ (34) 
and the public sector budget constraint is given by 
 ܩ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻܤ௧ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܶ௒ ൅ ௧ܶை (35) 
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A young (employed) agent in period ݐ maximizes (12) subject to a modified constraint, 
 ܿଵ,௧ ൅ ଵଵା௥೟శభ ܿଶ,௧ାଵ ൌ ݓ௧ െ ߬௧ െ
ଵା୬
ଵା௥೟శభ ߛ௧ାଵ (36) 
where, ߬௧ ൌ ௧ܶ௒/ܮ௧, and ߛ௧ ൌ ௧ܶை/ܮ௧. The maximization gives the following solution for saving 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ቂݏሺݓ௧ െ ߬௧ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ଵା௡ଵା௥೟శభ ߛ௧ାଵቃ ௧ܰ (37) 
where ݏ is given by (15). Alternatively, saving can be written 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ̃ݏ௧ሺݓ௧ െ ߬௧ሻ ௧ܰ (38) 
where the young generation’s saving rate out of the current disposable income (̃ݏ௧ሻ	is given by 
 ̃ݏ௧ ൌ
௦ሺ௪೟ିఛ೟ሻାሺଵି௦ሻ భశ೙భశೝ೟శభఊ೟శభ
௪೟ିఛ೟  (39) 
Using (38) and dividing through by ௧ܰ, (34)-(35) can be rewritten, 
 ሺ1 ൅ ߠ௧ሻሺܾ௧ାଵ ൅ ݍ௧ାଵ݇௧ାଵሻ ൌ ̃ݏ௧ሺݓ௧ െ ߬௧ሻ (40) 
 ݃௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻܾ௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߠ௧ሻܾ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ߬௧ ൅ ߛ௧ሻሺܮ௧/ ௧ܰሻ (41) 
where ݃௧ ൌ ܩ௧/ ௧ܰ, ܾ௧ ൌ ܤ௧/ ௧ܰ,  ݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧/ ௧ܰ, and ߠ௧ ൌ ௧ܰାଵ/ ௧ܰ. 
Steady growth with full employment requires that ௧ܰ ൌ ܮ௧ (thus, ߠ௧ ൌ ݊), ܾ௧ ൌ ܾ and ݑ௧ ൌ ݑ∗; 
we have ݎ௧ ൌ ݅, and ݓ, ݇ and ݍ are still given by (9), (24) and (29). There are three fiscal instruments, 
government consumption, taxes on the old and taxes on the young. Taking the taxes on the young to be 
the active instrument, we assume that ݃௧ ൌ ݃  and ߛ௧ ൌ ߛ  are exogenous. The analysis would be 
analogous with ݃ or ߛ as the active policy instrument. 
Substituting the steady-growth conditions into (40)-(41), using (39), and rearranging, the solution 
for ܾ becomes 
 ܾ∗ ൌ ௦௪ିሺଵା௡ሻ௤௞∗ଵା௡ା௦ሺ௜ି௡ሻ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௜ ߛ െ
௦
ଵା௡ା௦ሺ௜ି௡ሻ ݃ (41) 
This steady-growth solution for the required debt ratio (ܾ∗) depends inversely on public consumption (݃) 
and directly on the level of taxes on the old generation (ߛ).12 An increase in ݃ implies that consumption 
                                                      
12 An inverse relation between debt and government consumption is obtained in a non-OLG setting by Schlicht 
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has to contract in order to maintain equilibrium in the product market. This is achieved by increasing 
taxes on the young. As a result the desired saving decreases and this, in turn, reduces the need for 
government debt as an outlet for saving. Analogously, with a given value of ݃, an increase in ߛ must be 
accompanied by a reduction in ߬ in order to maintain the level of consumption and ensure equilibrium in 
the goods market; the disposable income of the young increases, and the amount of public debt must also 
increase to meet the rise in saving. 
Equation (42) also implies a relation between economic growth and public debt: the required debt 
is inversely related to the growth rate ݊ for empirically relevant values of the parameters; the partial 
߲ܾ/߲݊ is negative if ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻݍ݇ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݏሻሺݓ െ ݃ሻ ൐ 0 and the wage share greatly exceeds the share of 
government consumption (ݓ െ ݃ ൐ 0) in all OECD countries. Intuitively, debt is required because the 
young generation wants to save in excess of what is needed to provide fixed capital for the next 
generation. A higher growth rate raises the need for fixed capital and therefore reduces the need for public 
debt. 
The required debt, finally, depends on the interest rate, directly as well as indirectly via the effect 
of the interest rate on the choice of technique and the value of ݇∗. The relationship between ݅ and ܾ∗ 
can be interpreted in relation to the ‘natural rate of interest’ (p. 11): the interest rate that is consistent with 
full-employment growth – the natural rate of interest – depends on fiscal policy and the debt ratio. Putting 
it differently, functional finance (i) identifies the optimal capital intensity, (ii) sets the interest rate at the 
associated level through an appropriate monetary policy, and (iii) uses fiscal policy to make the natural 
interest rate equal to this optimally chosen rate. 
Equations (40)-(41) can be used to derive the steady-growth solution for the tax rate ߬: 
߬ ൌ ሺ௜ି௡ሻሾ௦௪ିሺଵା௡ሻ௤௞∗ሿଵା௡ା௦ሺ௜ି௡ሻ െ
ଵା௡
ଵା௜ ߛ ൅
ଵା௡
ଵା௡ା௦ሺ௜ି௡ሻ ݃ (43) 
An increase in ݃ raises ߬ and reduces ܾ∗; an increase in ߛ reduces ߬ and raises ܾ∗. It follows that 
shifts in ݃ or ߛ produce a negative correlation between the steady-growth values of ߬ and ܾ∗;	high 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(2006) and Ryoo and Skott (2013). 
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debt in these cases is associated with low tax rates. Other parameter shifts yield a positive correlation 
between ߬ and ܾ∗; a shift in the markup, for instance, will change ܾ∗ and ߬ in the same direction if 
݅ ൐ ݊.13  
 
5  Fluctuations in ‘confidence’ and intergenerational fairness 
The saving propensity may fluctuate across generations. These fluctuations could be the result of 
differences in the discount rate across generations, but unfounded variations in ‘confidence’ (or irrational 
exuberance) can do the trick too. Suppose, for instance, that young agents believe that in addition to the 
returns on their saving, they will have an after-tax income of ߝ. By assumption, the actual after-tax 
income will be the net tax on the old, that is, the value of ߝ௧ାଵ is given by െሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻγ௧ାଵ. Agents may 
not have perfect foresight, however, and for present purposes it does not matter whether a high ߝ reflects 
a mistaken belief about future taxes or an expectation that some other source of income will be available 
(e.g. an expectation of being able and willing to work in the second period). The state of confidence –the 
beliefs about future income – may be wrong, but the beliefs alter the perceived budget constraint and 
affect the saving decisions. The budget constraint now reads: 
ܿଵ,௧ ൅ ଵଵା௥೟శభ ܿଶ,௧ାଵ ൌ ݓ௧ െ τ௧ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௥೟శభ ߝ௧ାଵ        (44) 
Assuming, for simplicity, that there is no subjective uncertainty, the maximization of (12) subject to (44) 
implies that 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ቂݏሺݓ௧ െ ߬௧ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ଵଵା௜ ߝ௧ାଵቃ ௧ܰ (45) 
 ൌ ̃ݏሺߝሻሺݓ௧ െ ߬௧ሻ ௧ܰ (46) 
Distributionally neutral intervention 
A distributionally neutral policy intervention can be achieved by instituting a transfer to those 
                                                      
13 From (41) it follows that in steady growth ሺ݅ െ ݊ሻܾ ൌ ߬ ൅ ߛ െ ݃. Thus, ܾ and ߬ must move in the same 
direction if ݅, ݊, ߛ and ݃ are kept constant. 
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young generations that are unduly pessimistic (tend to consume too little) and finance the transfer by 
taxing the same generations when they get old.14 Conversely, an overly optimistic generation can be 
taxed in the first period and compensated by a transfer in the second. 
Substituting (45) into (40)-(41), full-employment growth requires that  
߬௧ ൌ ሺଵା௡ሻ௤௞
∗ା௚ାሺଵା௜ሻ௕೟ିఊ೟ି௦௪
ଵି௦ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௜ ߝ௧ାଵ (47) 
The tax on the old generation (ߛ௧) and the public debt (ܾ௧) appear on the right hand side of equation (47). 
These variables are pinned down by the neutrality requirement. 
Distributional neutrality implies that a generation should not be favored (or punished) because of 
a shift in the confidence of the succeeding generation. If ܾ∗ and ߛ∗ denote the steady-growth values of 
ܾ and ߛ when there are no variations in confidence, this condition can be stated formally as 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺݍ݇∗ ൅ ܾ௧ሻെߛ௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺݍ݇∗ ൅ ܾ∗ሻ െ ߛ∗ (48) 
The expression on the left hand side of equation (48) gives the income available to the old generation in 
period	ݐ. Neutrality requires that this income be equal to the level that characterizes the steady growth 
path. Output follows the full-employment path; the stabilization of the consumption of the old generation 
therefore implies that the consumption of the young will also be at its steady-growth value. 
Using (47) and (48), the equation for the tax on the young at time ݐ can now be written 
߬௧ ൌ ሺଵା௡ሻ௤௞
∗ା௚ାሺଵା௜ሻ௕∗ିఊ∗ି௦௪
ଵି௦ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௜ ߝ௧ାଵ (49) 
ൌ ߬∗ ൅ ଵଵା௜ ሾߝ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ∗ሿ (50) 
where ߬∗ is the steady-growth value of ߬ in the absence of variations in confidence. 
Using (41), (48) and (49), we have 
ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻܾ௧ାଵ ൌ ݃ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻܾ∗ െ ߛ∗ െ ߬∗ െ 11 ൅ ݅ ሾߝ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ
∗ሿ 
 ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻܾ∗ െ ଵଵା௜ ሾߝ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ∗ሿ (51) 
                                                      
14 The transfer stimulates the young generation’s consumption but a part of the transfer will be saved. The 
additional saving will be absorbed by the issue of government bonds. 
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 ߛ௧ାଵ ൌ ߛ∗ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻሺܾ௧ାଵ െ ܾ∗ሻ (52) 
 ൌ ߛ∗ െ ଵଵା௡ ሾߝ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ∗ሿ (53) 
 ൌ െ ଵଵା௡ ߝ௧ାଵ (54) 
Hence,  
 பத೟డఌ೟శభ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା௜ ,
డ௕೟శభ
డఌ೟శభ ൌ െ
ଵ
ሺଵା௜ሻሺଵା௡ሻ ,			
డఊ೟శభ
డఌ೟శభ ൌ െ
ଵ
ଵା௡ (55) 
 பத೟శೖడఌ೟శభ ൌ
డ௕೟శభశೖ
డఌ೟శభ ൌ
డఊ೟శభశೖ
డఌ೟శభ ൌ 0 for ݇ ൒ 1
 
 (56) 
A shock to a generation’s confidence is fully absorbed by adjustments in the taxes for that same 
generation; there are no persistent effects on the debt ratio. 
Tax expectations 
The above analysis uses systematic variations in ߬௧ and ߛ௧ାଵ to get distributional neutrality 
across generations. The analysis took the expected after-tax, non-capital income as exogenous, and this 
exogeneity assumption may seem unreasonable: it is often assumed that systematic variations in taxes 
will be anticipated. The private sector’s anticipation of future taxes does not, however, negate the 
possibility of distributionally neutral stabilization. 
Consider the other extreme where taxes are perfectly foreseen. In this case, confidence is 
characterized by the value of the expected pre-tax, non-capital income, ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ߝ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ௧ାଵ. 
Taxes can now be used as an insurance mechanism. Formally, let ߛ௧ାଵ be determined by  
 ߛ௧ାଵ ൌ ߛ∗ ൅ ௭̅೟శభଵା௡ (57) 
where ݖ௧̅ାଵ is the actual average non-capital income when the generation is old. By assumption there is 
symmetry across agents within a generation and the individual agent’s own income ݖ௧ାଵ will be equal to 
the average income ݖ௧̅ାଵ; the specification of taxes in terms of average income is used to preserve the 
lump-sum character of the tax.  
The tax scheme in (57) implies that the budget constraint (44) can be rewritten  
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 ܿଶ,௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ൫ݓ௧ െ ߬௧ െ ܿଵ,௧൯ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻሾݖ௧ାଵ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ௧ାଵሿ 
 ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ൫ݓ௧ െ ߬௧ െ ܿଵ,௧൯ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ∗ (58) 
The budget constraint becomes independent of ‘confidence’: the conditional tax scheme provides 
insurance and effectively guarantees that the after-tax, non-capital income will be equal to െሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻߛ∗. 
Consequently, the tax rate on the young can be set at the steady-growth level, ߬௧ ൌ ߬∗, no variations in ߬ 
are required. 
The assumptions underlying this example may be implausible: a combination of confidence 
effects and perfect anticipation of future taxes may seem even more questionable than the more common 
Ricardian assumptions of perfect foresight with respect to both taxes and future returns. In response to 
this objection, one can take one of two routes: assume that there are no variations in confidence or, 
alternatively, accept that variations in confidence do occur and that households do not fully anticipate 
future taxation. The first route we will leave to others; the second can be approached by examining – as in 
equation (49) – how variations in expected after-tax, non-capital income can be neutralized by taxation. 
Non-neutral intervention 
The analysis may be subject to another objection. We have assumed that the private sector is 
subject to swings in confidence; the government, by contrast, correctly infers the private sector’s 
expectations, correctly anticipates the future incomes, and has the ability to implement fairly sophisticated 
tax schemes. These assumptions may impose policy demands that no government can meet. 
Intergenerational neutrality and perfect government foresight are not required, however, for 
full-employment growth. 
To see this, consider the simple case in which capital income is taxed at a constant rate	ߚ, 
 ߛ௧ ൌ ߚሺݍ݇௧ ൅ ܾ௧ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻ (59) 
Returning to the case without private sector anticipation of future taxes, we take the expected future 
after-tax, non-capital income as exogenous; thus, the saving rate by the young generation is given by (45). 
Combining these assumptions with equations (40) and (41) – still assuming that ߬௧ is used as the active 
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instrument to ensure full-employment growth – the debt dynamics can be written 
 ܾ௧ାଵ ൌ ܣ െ ܤܾ௧ ൅ ଵሺଵା௡ሻሺଵା௜ሻሺଵି௦ሻ ߝ௧ାଵ (60) 
where 
 ܣ ൌ ௦ሾ௪ି௚ାఉሺଵା௜ሻ௤௞∗ሿି௤௞∗ሺଵା௡ሻሺଵା௡ሻሺଵି௦ሻ  (61) 
 ܤ ൌ ሺ1 െ βሻ ଵା௜ଵା௡
௦
ଵି௦ (62) 
If ߝ௧ ൌ 0 for all ݐ and the tax rate ߚ is sufficiently large, the difference equation (60) has a unique, 
stable stationary point, 
 ܾ∗∗ ൌ ஺ଵା஻ (63) 
Random fluctuations in ߝ generate fluctuations in ܾ௧. But if the fluctuations in ߝ are bounded then so 
are the fluctuations in ܾ௧15 
 
6  Discussion 
6.1  Public debt, interest rates and economic growth 
In OLG models an exogenous rise in debt will be associated with a fall in the capital stock and an 
increase in the return on capital. A functional finance approach to fiscal policy makes this result irrelevant: 
debt is allowed to increase if an increase is necessary to maintain both full employment and the optimal 
capital intensity. A perfectly executed fiscal policy of this kind may show fluctuations in debt (as in 
section 5), but the capital intensity and the return on capital are kept constant. 
Fiscal policy may not always be conducted in accordance with the principles of functional finance 
– the current obsession with austerity testifies to that – but the result carries important implications for 
empirical evaluation: observed correlations between interest rates and debt depend on the interaction 
between policy regimes and private sector behavior. Without knowledge of the sources of changes in the 
                                                      
15 Other non-neutral schemes could be used, including one with a balanced government budget at all times: tax the 
pessimistic young and transfer the tax revenue to the currently old generation. 
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public debt, there is no way to predict the empirical correlation between debt and interest rates. Thus, it is 
not surprising that the results of empirical studies are weak and inconclusive.16  
Disregarding this inconclusiveness, a standard OLG link is between the level of debt and the 
levels of capital and income. Recently, however, the possibility of a long-run relation between the debt 
ratio and the rate of economic growth has received great attention following the publication of Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010). The theoretical story behind this relation is unclear, and 
theoretical ambiguities accentuate the difficulty of interpreting empirical results.17 Accepting, for the 
sake of the argument, that a negative correlation can be found between debt and economic growth, a key 
question concerns causation. This question has two parts. The first part asks whether past episodes of high 
debt did in fact cause low growth, as opposed to a reverse causal link between the two variables or an 
explanation in which a third factor accounts for the changes in both debt and growth. Empirical studies by 
Irons and Bivens (2010), Basu (2013) and Dube (2013) conclude that causation has run from growth to 
debt. These empirical results could be driven by short and medium term effects of a slowdown in growth 
on deficits and debt, but the analysis in this paper lends theoretical support to the conclusions, also for the 
long run. As shown in section 4, functional finance produces a causal link between growth rates and debt: 
a reduction in the long-run rate of growth raises the long-run debt ratio. 
The second part of the question is more radical. One may ask whether it is at all meaningful to 
look for a general answer to a reduced-form question about the growth effects of public debt. According 
to Rogoff and Reinhart (2010, p. 6), 
 . . .war debts are arguably less problematic for future growth and inflation than large debts that are 
                                                      
16 In the words of Engen and Hubbard (2005, p.83), there is “little empirical consensus about the magnitude of the 
effect ... some economists believe there is a significant, large, positive effect of government debt on interest rates, 
others interpret the evidence as suggesting that there is no effect on interest rates” . Bohn (2010, p.14) makes a 
similar statement about the difficulty of finding significant interest effects of debt. He goes on to suggest that a 
“leading explanation is Ricardian neutrality” . There is no need for Ricardian neutrality to explain the results, 
however; our OLG model does not display neutrality. 
17 Kumar and Woo mention a number of possible channels, including the effect of higher interest rates on capital 
accumulation, and the potential effects of debt induced increases in “uncertainty about prospects and policies”. As 
discussed above, the evidence on a debt - interest rate link is tenuous, at best. The latter effect seems to be a close 
cousin of what Krugman has been referring to as the ‘confidence fairy’, and it is hard to see how contractionary 
fiscal policies will enhance confidence in a recession. 
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accumulated in peace time. Postwar growth tends to be high as war-time allocation of man-power and 
resources funnels to the civilian economy. Moreover, high war-time government spending, typically the cause 
of the debt buildup, comes to a natural close as peace returns. In contrast, a peacetime debt explosion often 
reflects unstable underlying political economy dynamics that can persist for very long periods.  
As pointed out by Michl (2013): 
To a Keynesian, the quote above would very sensibly read ‘high recession-time government spending, 
typically the cause of the debt buildup, comes to a natural close as growth returns.’ In fact, Keynes (1972, p. 
144) once aptly described government borrowing as “nature’s remedy” for preventing a recession from 
deteriorating into a total collapse in production. As for the rest of the quote, who would deny that ‘unstable 
political dynamics’ can be an obstacle to growth?  
 
A fiscal expansion is intrinsically neither good nor bad. A reckless fiscal expansion can cause 
overheating, inflation and macroeconomic instability. But sensible fiscal policies are adjusted in the light 
of prevailing economic circumstances, and the effects of bad policy say little about the growth effects of a 
fiscal expansion in a deep recession. The general point is simple: reduced-form correlations between debt 
and growth depend on the underlying sources of the movements in debt. 
6.2  Public debt and intergenerational distribution 
Claims that high public debt hurts future generations have figured prominently in popular debates 
and also appear in the academic literature. Having found that public debt has at most small effects on 
interest rates, Engen and Hubbard (2005), go on to caution that public deficits and debt still matter 
because large levels of government debt “can represent a large transfer of wealth to finance current 
generations’ consumption from future generations which much eventually pay down federal debt to a 
sustainable level.” (p. 132) 
The possibility that fiscal policy can hurt future generations is not controversial; inappropriate 
fiscal policy can have negative effects for future as well as for current generations. But our analysis of an 
OLG model without bequests – the setting that is most favorable to the case for adverse future effects of 
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public debt – shows that debt need not be a burden on future generations. On the contrary, it can serve to 
remove dynamic inefficiencies and maintain full employment. Fluctuations in ‘confidence’ can be 
addressed through policies that are neutral in their effects on the intergenerational distribution. Even when 
a policy is not fully neutral in this sense, future generations may be better off than without the policy. 
With a fixed tax rate on capital income, for instance, the required variations in the tax on the young 
generation will have distributional effects: a pessimistic generation will be favored by a reduction in its 
taxes (section 5). This result does not imply that future generations would be better off without the 
reduction. In the absence of fiscal expansion, a lack of demand would affect capacity utilization, reduce 
investment and the future capital stock, and jeopardize both current and future employment. 
6.3  Austerity and long term consolidation 
Entitlement programs like social security or medicare are prime targets of most austerity 
programs. Reductions in these programs have adverse intra-generational effects on distribution (which 
our model with identical agents within each generation cannot capture). More surprisingly, our analysis 
demonstrates that these reductions may also be counterproductive, assuming that the aim is to reduce 
public debt: reductions in social security and medicare correspond to a rise in the tax on the older 
generation, and as shown in section 4, an increase in the taxation of the old generation will raise the 
required debt. A reduction in government consumption (݃), likewise, requires an increase in the long-run 
debt. The general point, once again, is that the desirable level of public debt depends on a range of 
behavioral and policy variables. 
These results suggest that from a functional finance perspective some critiques of austerity may 
not go far enough. Krugman’s insistence that the slump is not the time to cut the debt is fully in line with 
functional finance, but he also suggests that the US has long-run budget problems that must be addressed 
once we are out of recession.18 The nature of the long-run debt problem is not made clear, however. This 
                                                      
18  “Yes, the United States has a long-run budget problem. Dealing with that problem is going to require, first of all, 
sharply bending the curve on Medicare costs; without that, nothing works. And second, it’s going to require some 
combination of spending cuts and revenue increases, amounting to at least 3 percent of GDP and probably more, on 
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is not to say that there can be no adverse consequences of high public debt. But these consequences have 
to be clearly specified and balanced against the benefits. 
 
7  Conclusions 
Are the current debt levels and fiscal deficits sustainable? It is not always clear what is meant by 
sustainability, but the question may be whether the fiscal requirements for full employment growth will 
generate an ever-increasing debt-GDP ratio. The analysis in this paper shows that fiscal policy and public 
debt may be needed to maintain full employment, and that this fiscal policy need not – and in our OLG 
model does not – lead to any kind of unsustainability.19 
The equilibrium debt ratio depends on the parameters of the model. Some parameters are of 
particular interest. Austerity policies, which tend to reduce government consumption and raise net taxes 
on the old, will raise the debt ratio. Empirical correlations between growth rates and debt ratios, moreover, 
are consistent with the model, but the causation runs from growth to debt. 
In steady growth all generations do equally well. Questions of inter-generational distribution may 
arise away from steady growth. We address this issue by introducing fluctuations in household 
‘confidence’, showing how full employment can be achieved using distributionally neutral policies. A 
failure to adjust fiscal policy in response to a decline a confidence, on the other hand, leads to aggregate 
demand problems and secular stagnation. 
The analysis has many limitations. We have focused on a closed economy, and the paper says 
nothing about the problems of open economies with public debt in a foreign currency.20 The neglect of 
heterogeneity within generations represents a second limitation. Public debt may have regressive 
                                                                                                                                                                              
a permanent basis.”  Krugman, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/notes-on-rogoff-wonkish/ 
19 As shown by Ryoo and Skott (2013), functional finance can produce unstable debt-income dynamics in settings 
with intra-generational heterogeneity. These unstable scenarios are closely linked to (intra-generational) distribution 
effects and can be avoided by changes in the structure of taxation. 
20 Chalk (2000, p. 319) argues that some OECD countries “have seen an explosion in their indebtedness to such an 
extent that the solvency of the public sector is brought into question.”  Solvency questions of this kind may be 
relevant for countries with debt in foreign currency. But it is unclear how a sovereign state could ever become 
insolvent if its debt obligations are denominated in a currency that it can print at will. 
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distributional effects if taxes on wage income are used to finance interest payments to the rich. The 
incentive effects of taxes, third, have been ignored throughout. As shown in section 4, a higher level of 
debt need not be associated with higher tax rates but even if it is, the structure of government 
consumption and the form of taxation may be more important than the level of debt for the public sector’s 
incentive effects.21 Fourth, the model only indirectly addresses inflationary concerns. Engen and Hubbard 
(2005) suggest that “federal government debt may also pose the temptation to monetize the debt, causing 
inflation” . They point out, however, that “this concern has not been a problem in the United States over 
the past fifty years” (p. 98); Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) also find no evidence for a link between debt and 
inflation in advanced economies. The inflation fear essentially boils down to a concern that policy may 
not in the future be governed by a functional finance criterion: “eliminate both unemployment and 
inflation” (Lerner 1943, p. 41). Functional finance, fifth, may imply that interest rates should be set to 
achieve a desired capital intensity. This objective need not exclude short-run variations in interest rates 
around the level associated with the chosen capital intensity. The level of public debt influences the 
effectiveness of short-run monetary policy. A contractionary monetary policy raises interest rates and 
generates an automatic fiscal expansion unless it is matched by an increase in tax rates. Thus, monetary 
policy is blunted when debt is high and this may complicate short-run economic policy.22 The simple 
OLG structure, sixth, may be appealing for an analysis of public debt, but it has peculiar properties that 
find no support in data. The model implies that the saving rate is inversely related to the profit share: only 
the young save, and the young get their income as wage income. Empirically, by contrast, saving rates are 
higher out of profits than wages; the saving assumptions that are at the center of the analysis in OLG 
models can be questioned.23 
                                                      
21 The importance of incentives for growth is disputed. Fast growth during the ‘golden age’ was associated with 
high marginal tax rates in the US, and the Nordic welfare states show a very respectable performance, including low 
unemployment and labor force participation rates that exceed those of the US. 
22  Ryoo and Skott (2015) analyze short-run stabilization in an economy characterized by Harrodian instability; see 
also Franke (2015). 
23 We abandon these assumptions in Ryoo and Skott (2013) which builds on the ‘stock-flow consistent’ framework 
from Skott (1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008). 
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Our analysis, finally, has taken as given the level of government spending. Public investment in 
infrastructure, education, health, and the environment clearly contribute to future welfare, and public 
consumption and social spending can also have a high future payoff, even in narrow economic terms (by 
reducing crime or raising future earnings, for instance). The benefits and distributional effects of public 
spending could justifiably be ignored in a discussion of public debt if this spending were already at an 
agreed-upon optimal level. A good deal of the debate over public debt, however, may reflect underlying 
controversies over the desirable level of public spending. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Appendix A: An OLG model with perfect competition and a Leontief production function 
Let the production function be  
௧ܻ ൌ minሼߣܮ௧, ߪܭ௧ሽ 
Assuming inelastic factor supplies, perfect competition implies that  
 ݓ௧ ൌ 0 if ߣܮ௧ ൐ ߪܭ௧ߣ if ߣܮ௧ ൏ ߪܭ௧ (64) 
					ݎ௧ ൅ ߜ ൌ ߪ if ߣܮ௧ ൐ ߪܭ௧0 if ߣܮ௧ ൏ ߪܭ௧ (65) 
The economy has two (non-trivial) steady growth paths.24 There is a full-utilization path with ߣܮ௧ ൌ ߪܭ௧ 
and25 
 ݓ ൌ ሺ2 ൅ ߩሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ఒఙ ൏ ߣ (66) 
ݎ ൅ ߜ ൌ ߪ െ ሺ2 ൅ ߩሻሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ ൐ 0 (67) 
The steady growth path described by equations (66)-(67) is dynamically efficient: any reduction in the 
capital-labor ratio would produce a return to capital that exceeds the growth in the labor force (ߪ െ ߜ ൐
݊). The path is also unstable, however: a negative shock to ݓ௧ reduces ܵ௧ (equation (16) and implies 
that ܭ௧/ܮ௧ ൏ ߣ/ߪ in the next period; as a result, ݓ௧	drops to 0, there is no saving, and the capital stock 
drops to 0. 
In addition to the efficient steady growth path and the trivial path with ܭ௧ ൌ 0, there is a locally 
stable steady growth path with less than full utilization of capital. Starting from the efficient path, a 
positive shock to ݓ raises saving, and capital intensity increases in the next period to give ܭ௧/ܮ௧ ൐ ߣ/ߪ. 
                                                      
24 In addition to these two paths there is a trivial steady-growth solution with ܭ௧ ൌ ௧ܻ ൌ0. 
25 The inequalities in (64)-(65) follow from condition (18). 
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The wage rate then rises to ݓ௧ ൌ ߣ in subsequent periods, and the economy will be following a steady 
growth path with excess capacity: 
 ݇ ൌ ఒሺଶାఘሻሺଵା௡ሻ ൐
ఒ
ఙ (68) 
This steady-growth path clearly is dynamically inefficient; the net return on capital is negative along this 
path; we have ݎ௧ ൌ െߜ ൑ ݊ Consumption could be increased by reducing investment and eliminating the 
excess capacity. 
 
